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Book Review: Commentaries on 
Selected Model Investment Treaties 
Edited by Chester Brown. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
2013. Pp. 1,024. £180.00. 
Reviewed by Jack J. Coe, Jr.* & Ashley K. Puscas** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Twenty-five years ago, a professor teaching an International Business 
Transactions course might reasonably have allocated only modest class time 
to Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), perhaps preferring to feature Frie-
ndship, Commerce and Navigation Treaties (FCNs) more prominently.1  The 
practical importance of FCNs might well have been explored by examining 
the ELSI case,2 in which the United States pressed a claim against Italy 
before the International Court of Justice, alleging that treatment received by 
a United States investor violated the Italy-U.S. FCN.3 
Although several countries including the United States had initiated BIT 
programs by February 1987 when the ELSI claim was initiated, few direct 
investor-State claims of the kind contemplated by most BITs had been 
launched.4  BITs were thus regarded as a device by which States desirous of 
 
* Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law. 
** Associate Attorney at Laura Devine Solicitors & Attorneys. 
 1. For a contemporaneous view of the perceived role of FCNs in protecting investors, see 
WALTER S. SURREY & CRAWFORD SHAW, A LAWYER’S GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
TRANSACTIONS 322-28 (1963).  
 2. Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (United States of America v. Italy), ICJ Judgment of July 
20, 1989. 
 3. See generally id. 
 4. Reportedly, the first BIT based investor-State arbitration was launched in 1987, the same 
year the application in ELSI was made.  See Sachet Singh & Sooraj Sharma, Investor-State Dispute 
1
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investment affirmed a general commitment to the rule of law by promising 
investors fair and non-discriminatory treatment and compensation in the 
event of expropriation.5  With respect to foreign direct investment, BITs 
represented an improvement upon FCNs by dealing with investment 
activities and protections in a more focused and comprehensive fashion.6  By 
way of innovation, however, they also generally contained each State’s 
consent to arbitrate claims brought directly against it by aggrieved investors 
from the other State who alleged breaches of the BIT in question.7 
The investor-State arbitration option found in many BITs eventually 
came to be utilized by investors, and not as an aberration.  In the mid-1990s, 
States were named as respondents in multiple arbitrations brought by foreign 
investors.8  Claims under NAFTA Chapter Eleven—essentially a trilateral 
investment treaty—were among the earliest to be initiated,9 but multiple 
 
Settlement Mechanism: The Quest for a Workable Roadmap, 29 MERKOURIOS 88, 90 (2013) (citing 
Asian Agricultural Products Ltd v. Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3 (1990)).  The U.K. 
investor in that case recovered approximately $500,000.  See Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. v. Sri 
Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3 (1990), available at 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita1034.pdf. 
 5. See generally Jack J. Coe, Jr. & Noah Rubin, Regulatory Expropriation and the Tecmed 
Case: Context and Contributions, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION: 
LEADING CASES FROM THE ICSID, NAFTA, BILATERAL TREATIES AND CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005). 
 6. See generally KENNETH VANDEVELDE, UNITED STATES INVESTMENT TREATIES POLICY 
AND PRACTICE 14-28 (1992); RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT 
TREATIES (1995). 
 7. Antonio R. Parra, Provisions on the Settlement of Investment Disputes in Modern 
Investment Laws, Bilateral Investment Treaties and Multilateral Instruments on Investment, 12 
ICSID REV. 287 (1997) (demonstrating how direct arbitral standing for investors is a common 
feature). 
 8. See generally Jack J. Coe, Jr. & Clyde C. Pearce, Arbitration Under NAFTA Chapter 
Eleven: Some Pragmatic Reflections Upon the First Case Filed Against Mexico, 23 HASTINGS INT’L 
& COMP. L. REV. 311 (2000). 
 9. Id. 
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claims under BITs soon followed.10  The incidence of such claims continued 
to increase—perhaps encouraged by the handful of recoveries experienced 
by some, but certainly not all, investors.11 
A surge in the literature addressing BITs, which often focused upon 
investor-State arbitration, corresponded to the proliferation in investment 
claims that continued into the new millennium.12  The available commentary 
enlarged from a small cache of books13 and articles14 to the now 
overwhelming, and still expanding, corpus of works by academics, 
practitioners, and various governmental and intergovernmental entities.  To a 
large extent, these writings assess the content of BITs through the arbitral 
jurisprudence produced under them.15 
 
 10. See UNCTAD, Reform of Investor-State Dispute Resolution: In Search of a Roadmap, IIA 
ISSUES NOTE, NO. 2, June 2013, at 2, available at 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2013d4_en.pdf.  
 11. The NAFTA Claim by Ethyl against Canada reportedly led to a $13 million settlement.  
See Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA’s Investment Protections 
and the Misguided Quest for an International “Regulatory Takings” Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
30, 132 (2003).  The tribunal in Metalclad v. Mexico awarded the investor over $16 million.  See 
Jack J. Coe, Jr., Metalclad -A Retrospective, in NAFTA ARBITRATION REPORTS (J.C. Thomas & J.C. 
Mowatt eds., 2002).  While more substantial than some recoveries had by investors, see supra note 
4, these amounts were truly modest in comparison to certain subsequent awards that have more 
robustly caused States to reconsider their consent to arbitrate investor-State claims.  See, e.g., 
UNCTAD, Recent Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, IIA ISSUES NOTE, NO. 1, May 
2013, at 1, available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2013d3_en.pdf 
(reporting on the $1.77 billion award made to Occidental in its arbitration against Ecuador 
Occidental Petroleum Corp. & Occidental Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/06/11 (2012)).  
 12. See generally CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN QC ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES (2007). 
 13. See VANDEVELDE, supra note 6, at 14-28; DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 6. 
 14. See K. Scott Gudgeon, United States Bilateral Investment Treaties: Comments on their 
Origin, Purposes, and General Treatment Standards, 4 INT’L TAX & BUS. L. 105, 105 (1986); 
Gerald Aksen, The Case for Bilateral Investment Treaties, in PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD: 
PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS IN 1981 357 (1981).   
 15. See CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN QC ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: 
SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES (2007).  
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Approximately 2,850 BITs now exist16—a number representing 
explosive growth over the last two decades.17  These treaties display many 
common patterns and common sections of texts, suggesting the use of 
standard models and considerable cross-pollination.  Being the product of 
individual bilateral negotiations, however, such treaties naturally exhibit 
purposeful variations and noticeable diversity.  After all, no single model 
could be expected to suffice on a global basis without some adjustments 
given the range of States involved and their distinctive circumstances—
economic, political and legal.  In getting to the bottom of this mix of 
diversity and uniformity, one can hardly do better than to consult 
Commentaries on Selected Model Investment Treaties (Commentaries), a 
substantial, one-volume work recently published by Oxford University Press 
and edited by Dr. Chester Brown.18 
II. STRUCTURE AND SCOPE OF THE BOOK 
Commentaries presents detailed and substantial examinations of selected 
investment treaty programs, comprising of 895 pages and 18 chapters.19  The 
individual chapters’ authors are from government, academia, and private 
practice.20  With the exception of the chapter on NAFTA,21 each chapter 
 
 16. See UNCTAD, Towards a New Generation of International Investment Policies: 
UNCTAD’s Fresh Approach to Multilateral Investment Policy-Making, IIA ISSUES NOTE, NO. 5, 
July 2013 [hereinafter New Generation], available at 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2013d6_en.pdf. 
 17. UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959–1999, iii, UNCTAD Doc. 
UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2 (2000), available at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/poiteiiad2.en.pdf (describing the 
“rapid increase” in BITs during the 1990s, amounting to a nearly a five-fold increase between the 
end of the 1980s and the end of the 1990s).  
 18. COMMENTARIES ON SELECTED MODEL INVESTMENT TREATIES (Chester Brown ed., 2013) 
[hereinafter COMMENTARIES]. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. See Andrea Bjorklund, NAFTA Chapter 11, in COMMENTARIES, supra note 18, at 465.   
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addresses a specific country and focuses on Model BIT practices of that 
specific State.  Common chapter features include a general commentary on 
the history of the respective State’s BIT policy, a detailed discussion of the 
model’s principal provisions, and the textual variations found in practice.22 
Although Commentaries is limited to sixteen countries plus NAFTA, the 
States selected for inclusion remind us that BIT relations are no longer 
limited to the original pattern in which a particular capital exporting country, 
based on a model text of its design, formed a BIT with a country seeking 
foreign direct investment.23  While, as one would expect, the book has 
chapters on the model BIT programs of Canada, Italy, France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States, so too are there 
chapters analyzing the models adopted by China, Columbia, Korea, Latvia, 
and Russia.24  BITs are now often formed between States at equivalent 
stages of development,25 and promoted by States that not long ago had to be 
coaxed to accept BIT obligations in order to attract foreign direct 
investment. 
 
 22. The work also contains comprehensive tables listing the book’s contents (chapter-by-
chapter), the cases cited, the treaty instruments examined, and a serviceable index.  COMMENTARIES, 
supra note 18.  All but one chapter ends with a “select bibliography.”  Id. 
 23. A recurrent question raised within the literature is whether BITs in fact stimulate foreign 
direct investment and correspondingly whether States benefit in such measure as to warrant the risks 
and costs associated with investor-State arbitration.  See Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign 
Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT’L 
L. 639 (1997).    
 24. COMMENTARIES, supra note 18. 
 25. See New Generation, supra note 16, at 5. 
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III. BIT SIMILARITIES AND DIVERGENT RESULTS 
As a perusal of Commentaries will confirm, many similarities exist 
among BITs.26  A cluster of treatment undertakings are virtually standard; 
promises of national treatment, most favored nation treatment, fair and 
equitable treatment,27 full protection and security,28 and compensation in the 
event of measures equivalent to a taking29 are commonplace within BITs.30 
A standard template also seems to have influenced the investor-State 
arbitration provisions found in most BITs.  Typically, an investor is given a 
choice of two arbitral formats.  Not uncommonly the two alternatives are 
arbitration administered by the International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID)31 or UNCITRAL Rules arbitration.32  In 
 
 26. See James Crawford, Foreword, in COMMENTARIES, supra note 18, at vii (“customary 
international law is ‘shaped by the conclusion of more than two thousand bilateral investment 
treaties and many [FCN treaties]’”). 
 27. See UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment, UNCTAD Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/11 
(Vol. III) (1999), available at http://unctad.org/en/docs/psiteiitd11v3.en.pdf.  
 28. See George Foster, Recovering ‘Protection and Security’: The Treaty Standard’s Obscure 
Origins, Forgotten Meaning, and Key Current Significance, 45 VAND. J. OF TRANSNAT’L L. 1095 
(2012). 
 29. Jack J. Coe, Jr. & Noah Rubin, Regulating Expropriation and the Tecmed Case: Context 
and Contributions, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION: LEADING CASES FROM 
THE ICSID, NAFTA, BILATERAL TREATIES AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005). 
 30. The common, recurrent, treatment undertakings may also evidence customary international 
law.  See Crawford, supra note 26. 
 31. There are two forms of ICSID arbitration: ICSID Convention Arbitration and ICSID 
Additional Facility Arbitration.  If both the host State and home State have ratified the ICSID 
Convention (International Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and 
Nationals of Other States art. 37(2)(b), Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 
[hereinafter ICSID Convention]) the Convention supplies the applicable arbitral regime.  See 
CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY (2009); LUCY REED, JAN 
PAULSSON, AND NIGEL BLACKABY, GUIDE TO ICSID ARBITRATION (2011) [hereinafter GUIDE].  If 
only one of the two States involved has ratified the Convention, ICSID Additional Facility Rules 
arbitration may still be available.  Indeed, the Additional Facility has been pressed into service in 
recent years for NAFTA Chapter Eleven disputes.  Until recently, the United States was the only 
6
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practice, the majority of investor-State arbitrations have been administered 
by ICSID,33 though by no means to the exclusion of the UNCITRAL 
option.34 
To date, investors have initiated arbitration well over 500 times 
advancing claims representing billions of dollars. 35  States from virtually 
every region have been named respondents, often several times.36  The 
 
NAFTA State to have ratified the ICSID Convention.  As a consequence, ICSID Convention 
arbitration was not available to a NAFTA investor.  
 32. See generally Stephen Jagush & Jeffrey Sullivan, A Comparison of ICSID and UNCITRAL 
Rules Arbitration: Areas of Divergence and Concern, in THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT 
ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY (Michael Waibel et al. eds., 2010); Piero Bernardini, 
ICSID Versus Non-ICSID Investment Treaty Arbitration (Sept. 15, 2009), available at 
http://www.arbitration-icca.org/media/0/12970223709030/bernardini_icsid-vs-non-icsid-
investent.pdf. 
 33. Susan D. Franck, The ICSID Effect? Considering Potential Variations in Arbitration 
Awards, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 977 (2011) (demonstrating ICSID is rightly considered the leading 
international arbitration institution devoted to investor-State dispute settlement). 
 34. See generally Jagush & Sullivan, supra note 32. 
 35. See UNCTAD, Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement: In Search of a Roadmap, IIA 
ISSUES NOTE, NO. 2, June 2013, at 2, available at 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2013d4_en.pdf.  The rapid growth in the 
investor-State docket has been made possible by two structural predicates: a high number of ICSID 
parties (at present, 149 States, see ICSID, https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID) and the large number 
of sovereign commitments to arbitrate found principally, but not exclusively, in the plentiful BITs in 
existence.  Cf. GUIDE, supra note 31, at 57-58 (majority of cases now BIT cases); UNCTAD, supra 
note 17, at iii (describing the “rapid increase” in BITs during the 1990s, amounting to a nearly a 
five-fold increase between the end of the 1980s and the end of the 1990s).  Added to these factors is 
the tendency of States to regulate on a sector-wide basis, such that a single measure may affect 
investors from many countries thus implicating many different BITs.  See R. Doak Bishop & 
Roberto Aguirre Luzi, Investment Claims: First Lessons from Argentina, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND ARBITRATION: LEADING CASES FROM THE ICSID, NAFTA, BILATERAL TREATIES AND 
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 425 (2005). 
 36. The ICSID website offers case analyses that include illustrative charts.  See The ICSID 
Caseload - Statistics, ICSID, https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/resources/Pages/ICSID-
Caseload-Statistics.aspx (last visited Jan. 18, 2015). 
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heavy-laden investor-State docket37 demonstrates that among investors, the 
perception persists that BIT arbitration, for all its flaws, is often to be 
preferred to either espousal (typified by the ELSI case)38 or local courts.39 
The investor-State system, however, was not fully prepared for the 
heavy accumulation of cases that occurred.  Initial flurries of awards helped 
accentuate the system’s lack of a formal ordering of precedent and the 
absence an appeals mechanism to unify decisional authority;40 these two 
attributes—some would say “weaknesses”—came to be much discussed 
when awards based on highly similar or identical BIT texts occasionally 
diverged.41 
 
 37. See generally Jose E. Alavarez, The Public International Law Regime Governing 
International Investment, 344 RECUEIL DES COURS (HAGUE ACADEMY OF INT’L L.) 195, 368-405 
(2011); cf. Roberto Dañino, Opening Remarks at Symposium on “Making the Most of Investment 
Agreements” (Dec. 12, 2005), available at, 
http://www.oecd.org/investment/internationalinvestmentagreements/36053800.pdf  (stating that by 
the end of 2005, there were 113 pending cases, representing “exponential growth”).  
 38. Concerning espousal of claims by the investor’s State of nationality, as occurred in the 
ELSI case, see generally Preliminary Report of the International Law Commission on Diplomatic 
Protection, Feb. 4, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/484 (Bennouna: Rapporteur) [hereinafter Preliminary 
Report]; Werner Goldschmidt, Transactions Between States and Public Firms and Private Foreign 
Firms (A Methodological Study), 136 RECUEIL DES COURS (HAGUE ACADEMY OF INT’L L.) 203, 
239-42 (1972); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 406-407 (5th ed. 
1998); PETER MALUNCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 256-57 
(7th ed. 1997); JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S ARTICLES ON STATE 
RESPONSIBILITY 223-224 (2002).    
 39. See Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Investment Disputes: The 
Roles of ICSID and MIGA, 1 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INV. L.J. 1 (1986).  Especially when the 
arbitration is being conducted other than under the ICSID Convention, local courts nevertheless 
continue to play a role.  See generally Jack J. Coe, Jr., Domestic Court Control of Investment 
Awards: Necessary Evil or Achilles Heel Within NAFTA and the Proposed FTAA?, 19 J. INT’L ARB. 
185 (2002); David Williams, Review and Recourse Against Awards Rendered Under Investment 
Treaties, 4 J. WORLD INV. 251 (2003).    
 40. Singh & Sharma, supra note 4, at 99-100. 
 41. Susan Franck, Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public 
International Law through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1521 (2005). 
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IV. FRONT–END ADJUSTMENTS—THE U.S. EXAMPLE 
As one might expect, successive generations of BITs demonstrate an 
awareness of the divergent arbitral decisions now in the public domain.  
Although it is common for critics favoring State sovereignty to focus heavily 
on the claim mechanisms established by BITs, calls to eliminate investor-
State arbitration fully are not likely to be embraced widely.  What is evident 
from State practice chronicled in Commentaries is that generally Sates have 
chosen not to do away with the “back end” of BITs (the investor claims 
sections), but have elected instead to regulate outcomes by adding guidance 
in the “front end”—where the substantive promises are set forth.42 The 
resulting trend is for the BIT texts to involve more detail than earlier models.  
The substantive impact of the added precision has generally been to restrict 
theories of recovery.43 
The U.S. BIT program is among the more mature and influential 
programs, and for present purposes, it effectively illustrates how States may 
refine BIT texts—typically by adding provisions—to address new concerns 
as they emerge.  The result has been longer, more detailed BITs addressing 
increasingly more topics. 
A. An Early Focus on Expropriation 
The initial BIT models published by the United States were made up of 
provisions inspired in part by the provisions on investment found in the FCN 
treaties to which the United States was a party.44  Those investment 
provisions were isolated and supplemented during the 1980s in formulating 
 
 42. COMMENTARIES, supra note 18. 
 43. See generally Stephen M. Schwebel, The United States 2004 Model Bilateral Investment 
Treaty: An Exercise in the Regressive Development of International Law (paper delivered to the 
ABA Section of International Law) (Feb. 21, 2006), available at http://www.transnational-dispute-
management.com/article.asp?key=780. 
 44. Id.  
9
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what would become an evolving U.S. Model BIT and the basis for NAFTA 
Chapter 11.45  The U.S. program was introduced to replicate what certain 
European countries had already initiated.46  Although the protections to be 
created were bilateral, the principal aim of U.S. BITs was to promote 
outbound foreign investment, by establishing on a country-by-country basis 
for minimal protections in prospective host States.47 
In the mid-1980s, the prospect of U.S. investors suffering 
uncompensated expropriations was very much in the minds of U.S. treaty 
drafters.48  These concerns were evident in the model texts produced by the 
United States; they contained elaborate provisions on the fullness and 
effectiveness of compensation to be given in the event of a taking and a 
notion of taking that included much more than outright seizures—extending 
to measures “tantamount to expropriation.”49  Modern BITs of the United 
States still have elaborate expropriation provisions, and indeed those 
provisions have become more detailed with the introduction of an additional 
set of considerations coming to the forefront soon after NAFTA took 
effect.50 
 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Two factors combined to focus attention on the need to regulate expropriations: First, there 
had been a wave of expropriations affecting US companies during in the late 1950s—most notably 
by Castro’s Cuba and by Brazil (together involving billions of dollars in US property).  
VANDEVELDE, supra note 6, at 24.  The twenty years that followed, in turn, were punctuated by 
episodes involving seizures affecting US citizens’ property.  Id. at 20-21.  Second, there was concern 
about the direction that customary international law might be taking, in light of calls in the 1970’s in 
some quarters for a New International Economic Order (NIEO).  See id.  One precept exemplifying 
the NIEO movement was that developing countries should be held only to a flexible standard in 
accounting for their actions regarding the property of others.  Id.  Thus, the notion that customary 
international law required full compensation in cases of expropriation was subject to debate.  Added 
to this was the loss of American property occurring in the late 1970s when the Islamic Revolution 
led to a change of government in Iran.  Id. 
 49. See generally id. at 14-28; DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 6. 
 50. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
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B. Sample Adjustments 
Although the United States is a party to numerous BITs that allow 
investor claims, it has predominantly been NAFTA that has generated 
investment claims against the United States.51  Not surprisingly, the 
adjustments one finds in successive U.S. Model BITs to a large extent 
address U.S. experience as a Respondent under NAFTA Chapter 11, a treaty 
which was no doubt thought to reflect the state of the art in 1992.52  These 
adjustments have clarified (in a pro-State manner) the scope of the 
substantive protections accorded investors, while also introducing some new 
features. 
U.S. Model BITs now address the thorny question of regulatory taking, 
which NAFTA (being based on existing BITs) has yet to fully tackle.  The 
question was to what extent regulation pursued for a public purpose could 
constitute an expropriation so as to trigger the obligation to tender full 
compensation.  On one hand, to exempt all regulation would supply an 
unduly large regulatory space and render a treaty’s taking provisions almost 
meaningless (since most often States will act through some form of 
“regulation” and will ostensibly act for a public purpose).  On the other 
hand, it might be argued that a chilling effect will naturally follow if there is 
a duty to make compensation to foreign enterprises whenever regulation, 
however laudable and necessary, eliminates or substantially curtails an 
investment.53 
In the absence of precise guidance in BITs, the approaches of tribunals 
to regulatory taking had varied significantly.  The question would come into 
sharper focus with NAFTA claims such as that brought against the United 
 
 51. See generally Bureau of Public Affairs, Diplomacy in Action, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE, www.state.gov (last visited Feb. 5, 2015). 
 52. See generally Jack J. Coe, Jr. & Clyde C. Pearce, Arbitration Under NAFTA Chapter 
Eleven: Some Pragmatic Reflections Upon the First Case Filed Against Mexico, 23 HASTINGS INT’L 
& COMP. L. REV. 311 (2000). 
 53. See Coe & Rubin, supra note 29, at 598-99. 
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States by Methanex in response California legislation phasing MTBE out of 
the gasoline sold in that state.54  Ultimately, the 2004 and 2012 U.S. Model 
BITs addressed the question by establishing a species of presumption, 
lessening host State exposure to taking liability.  Implementation of this 
technique can be seen, for example, in the Korea-U.S. Trade Agreement, 
which in relevant part states: 
Except in rare circumstances, such as, for example, when an action or a series of actions 
is extremely severe or disproportionate in light of its purpose or effect, non-
discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and applied to protect 
legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety, the environment, and 
real estate price stabilization (through, for example, measures to improve the housing 
conditions for low-income households), do not constitute indirect expropriations.55 
A second illustration of a BIT adjustment relates to fair and equitable 
treatment clauses, and also illustrates the use of a clarification tool now built 
into U.S. BITs.  Fair and equitable treatment clauses are common among 
 
 54. Methanex Corp. v. U.S., In the Matter of An Arbitration under Chapter 11 of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement and the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Final Award of the 
Tribunal (Aug. 3, 2005). 
 55. KORUS FTA, ANNEX B 11-B.  The reference to housing prices is not found in the U.S. 
Models of 2004 and 2012, and thus demonstrates how standard BIT provisions are tailored to meet 
concerns arising uniquely with respect to the treaty partner in question.  Footnote 19 of the KORUS 
FTA text adds: “[f]or greater certainty, the list of ‘legitimate public welfare objectives’ in 
subparagraph (b) is not exhaustive.”  A study of Commentaries demonstrates that regulatory taking 
“clarifications” of this type are found not only in the U.S. Models of 2004 and 2012, but in the 
models of Canada, Colombia and Korea, which texts the U.S. Model has seemingly influenced.  See 
Celine Levesque & Andrew Newcombe, Canada, in COMMENTARIES, supra note 18, at 93-94; Jose 
Antonio Rivas, Colombia, in COMMENTARIES, supra note 18, at 244; Hi-Taek Shin, Republic of 
Korea, in COMMENTARIES, supra note 18, at 393, 408-11.  Interestingly, some States have 
embellished the basic formula set forth in the U.S. 2004 model by suggesting what is meant by 
“except in rare circumstances.”  See Rivas, supra note 55, at 224 (reprinting article VI of the 
Colombian model which in pertinent part provides: “except in rare circumstances, such as when 
[measures] are so severe in light of their purpose that they cannot be reasonably viewed as having 
been adopted in good faith”). 
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several generations of BITs,56 but when invoked under NAFTA, they raised 
questions of first impression.  Chief among these questions was whether the 
promise of fair and equitable treatment was an autonomous treaty 
undertaking (subject to an ordinary meaning approach) or a promise 
rigorously circumscribed by customary international law.57  The question 
divided tribunals and commentators, though host States were in rather solid 
accord that the standard was indeed intended to be anchored exclusively and 
restrictively in customary international law as classically understood.58 
As has been much discussed, the approach of the NAFTA states was to 
issue a binding Interpretive Note in 2001;59 the contents of which would 
later be reflected in subsequent U.S. Model BITs.  That Note affirmed that 
NAFTA’s fair and equitable treatment promise accorded protection no more 
expansive than that established under customary international law.60  The 
interpretive note mechanism, of course, may be employed with respect to 
many interpretive questions that arise in relation to BITs to which the United 
States is a party.61 
A third substantive example from among dozens of purposeful 
refinements introduced into a U.S. Model BIT is seen in essential security 
 
 56. See generally Jack J. Coe, Jr., Fair and Equitable Treatment Under NAFTA’s Investment 
Chapter, 96 AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L LAW PROC. (2002).  
 57. See generally J. Christopher Thomas, Reflections on Article 1105 of NAFTA: History, 
State Practice and the Influence of Commentators, 17 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INV. L. J. 21, 21 (2002). 
 58. Id. 
 59. See FTC Note of July 31, 2001.  See generally Charles H. Brower, II, Why the FTC Notes 
of Interpretation Constitute a Partial Amendment of NAFTA Article 1105, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 347, 
347 (2006). 
 60. Id. 
 61. The Korea-U.S. Trade Agreement provides an example that closely follows the U.S. 
Models of 2014 and 2012 example: “A decision of the Joint Committee declaring its interpretation 
of a provision of this Agreement under Article 22.2.3(d) (Joint Committee) shall be binding on a 
tribunal, and any decision or award issued by a tribunal must be consistent with that decision.”  
KORUS FTA, arts. 22.2.3(d); 1122(3).  For criticism of the Interpretive Note Mechanism, see 
Brower, supra note 59, at 347, and Charles H. Brower, II, Structure, Legitimacy, and NAFTA’s 
Investment Chapter, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 37 (2003). 
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provisions.  Article 18 of the 2012 U.S. Model provides in relevant part: 
“[n]othing in this treaty shall be construed to .†.†. preclude a Party from 
applying measures that it considers necessary for the fulfillment of its 
obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international 
peace or security, or the protection of its own essential security interests.”62 
According to Caplan’s and Sharpe’s contributions to Commentaries,63 
the language is intended to be clear that the determination of what is 
necessary is “within the discretion of the Party” taking the measure.64  This 
explicitness with respect to the provision’s self-judging character is intended 
to be an improvement upon the formulation found, for example, in the 
Argentina-U.S. BIT.  Article XI of that text is not clear on the question of 
who decides when a measure was “necessary”—the respondent State or the 
tribunal.65  An example of the provision as clarified can be found, for 
instance, in the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement.66 
V. PARSING THE TEXTS 
As noted above, many of the thousands of BITs in existence share 
several common characteristics.  Yet, a review of investor-State awards 
confirms that differences in BIT texts remain important.  The kinds of 
detailed comparisons that one might wish to make will certainly be 
 
 62. U.S. Model BIT (2012), art. 18(2) (emphasis added). 
 63. Lee Caplan & Jeremy Sharpe, United States, in COMMENTARIES, supra note 18, at 755.  
The requirement that the provision be applied in good faith, in principle, prevents a State from 
exploiting opportunistically the self-judging element in the provision.  See id.   
 64. Id. at 813. 
 65. The Argentina-U.S. BIT is reprinted in LUCY REED ET AL., GUIDE TO ICSID ARBITRATION 
311 (2d ed. 2011).  On the issues raised by the evolving essential security text, see generally 
KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES—HISTORY, POLICY, AND 
INTERPRETATION 179-86 (2010).  
 66. KORUS FTA, art. 23.2.  A footnote in the KORUS FTA adds: “For greater certainty, if a 
Party invokes Article 23.2 in an arbitral proceeding initiated under Chapter Eleven (Investment) 
…the tribunal or panel hearing the matter shall find that the exception applies”  Id. n. 2.  
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facilitated by Commentaries.  Indeed, when traveling back and forth among 
the book’s chapters, one encounters both stark line drawing and quite subtle 
crafting. 
Umbrella clauses provide an example.  Such provisions typically 
provide a pledge that the host State shall “observe any obligation it may 
have entered into with regard to investment.”67  Some States had come to 
disfavor umbrella clauses in light of the expansive scope accorded them by 
some tribunals.  In the Commentaries chapter devoted to Colombia’s BIT 
program is a section titled “Rejection of the Umbrella Clause.”  Dr. Rivas 
reports there that umbrella clauses are excluded “[a]s a strict policy 
matter.”68  By contrast, umbrella clauses are standard in the Chinese69 and 
Austrian70 models.  In light of the confusion umbrella clauses have generated 
with respect to contract disputes,71 the Austrian text is admirably 
straightforward and adds a helpful detail.  After the familiar “shall observe 
any obligation” sentence, the treaty provides: “This means, inter alia, that 
the breach of a contract between the investor and the host State or one of its 
entities will amount to a violation of this treaty.”72 
Some differences among BIT texts are subtler.  Looking again at the 
Colombian model,73 one finds much in common with other BITs, but also a 
distinctive treatment of full protection and security.  While promising fair 
and equitable treatment in accordance with customary international law, the 
model circumscribes its undertaking with respect to full protection and 
security: “The full protection and security standard does not imply . . . a 
better treatment to that accorded to nationals of the Contracting Party where 
 
 67. Argentina–U.S. BIT, art. II.2.c. 
 68. See Rivas, supra note 55, at 241. 
 69. Wenhua Shan & Norah Gallagher, China, in COMMENTARIES, supra note 18, at 131. 
 70. Reinisch, Austria, in COMMENTARIES, supra note 18, at 35. 
 71. See Katarin Yannaca-Small, BIVAC BV v. Paraguay: The Umbrella Clause Still in Search 
of One Identity, 28 ICSID REV. 307, 307 (2013). 
 72. Reinisch, supra note 70, at 35 (quoting article 11 of the Austrian Model). 
 73. See Rivas, supra note 55, at 185 (examining Article III.4 of the Colombia’s model). 
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the investment has been made.”74  That caveat, which seems to reduce 
Columbia’s full protection and security undertaking to a promise of national 
treatment, is in tension with the model’s general endorsement of the 
international minimum standard.75 
VI. TERMINATION PROVISIONS—NOT SUCH A FRESH START 
Many of the chapters in Commentaries discuss BIT termination 
provisions.  Interest in these treaty terms has grown in recent years in part 
because by the end of 2013 more than 1,300 of the existing BITs became 
eligible for unilateral termination.76  As one can discover by consulting 
Commentaries, however, protection often does not end with termination 
becoming effective.  For existing investments there is often what might be 
called a “BIT hangover”—a period of ten or fifteen years during which the 
BITs protections continue to apply.77  The prospect of termination, 
prefigured explicitly in many BITs, may of course lead to renegotiation, 
giving the two States an opportunity to account for the learning of the last 
twenty years. 
In evaluating the kinds of BIT strategies available to States, the question 
of investor-State arbitration inevitably arises.  The possibility of doing away 
 
 74. Id. at 216-17. 
 75. One by-product of there being an international minimum standard is that merely treating 
foreign investors as well as local enterprise does not necessarily discharge a State’s obligations; the 
minimum standard may require better treatment than that meted out to local investors.   
 76. See UNCTAD, International Investment Policymaking in Transition: Challenges and 
Opportunities of Treaty Renewal, IIA ISSUES NOTE, NO. 4, June 2013, at 1, available at 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2013d9_en.pdf.  In March 2014, it was 
announced that Indonesia was terminating its BIT with the Netherlands.  See Termination Bilateral 
Investment Treaty, NETHERLANDS EMBASSY IN JAKARTA, INDONESIA, 
http://indonesia.nlembassy.org/organization/departments/economic-affairs/termination-bilateral-
investment-treaty.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2015).  The Indonesian government intends to terminate 
all 67 of its BITs, and time will tell whether the country is planning on renegotiating the terms of the 
agreements or eliminating them altogether.  See id.  
 77. Id. 
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with investor-State arbitration—in effect eliminating the back half of most 
BITs—is a recurrent topic among commentators and States.  The question 
arises, however: what would replace investor-State arbitration?  Bearing in 
mind the problems plaguing many court systems in the world, investors will 
not generally gravitate toward host States offering only local courts in the 
event of perceived mistreatment.  States, in turn, are unlikely to revert on a 
wholesale basis to the traditional espousal model with its inefficiencies and 
risks.  For all its deficiencies, investor-State arbitration concentrates risk and 
control in the dispute’s real parties at interest and considerably depoliticizes 
the investor grievance process.78 
Some governments have proposed the creation of a first instance 
investment tribunal on a regional or international basis.79  That is an 
intriguing idea, but in the eyes of investors, such an institution will unlikely 
represent a satisfactory mechanism for avoiding domestic courts unless it 
possesses, ironically, many of the attributes characterizing the existing 
arbitration mechanism: party control over the judges that will preside in a 
given case, decision maker independence and expertise, flexibility of 
procedure, and treaty-backed enforceability of the court’s rulings on 
liability.  At present, such an institution appears to be quite far off, leaving 
investor-State arbitration the best alternative in offering investors a way to 
assert grievances away from local courts. 
For its part, the arbitral claims machinery could be refined in numerous 
ways.80  One notion gaining support, that might be reflected in future 
generations of BITs, is the use of mediation as a precursor or parallel 
process to arbitration.  Over one-third of investor-State claims settle, 
suggesting that a percentage of such claims ought to be good candidates for 
 
 78. See Shihata, supra note 39, at 32. 
 79. See H. Rondón de Sansó, Proposal of Changes to the System of Investment Dispute 
Resolution: A Contribution from South America, TDM 1 (2014). 
 80. For recent thoughts, see generally Anna Joubin-Bret & Jean Kalicki, eds., “Reform of 
Investor-State Dispute Settlement: In Search of a Roadmap”, 1 TDM (2014) (collection of essays). 
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mediation and the value it can add.81  Though the prospect of using 
mediation routinely was not seriously contemplated even ten years ago, it 
has recently attracted greater interest,82 in part because of the formulation of 
investor-State mediation rules83 and related initiatives. 
VII. A VALUABLE REFERENCE 
BITs and investor-State arbitration have inspired abundant literature—a 
full account of which would be nearly impossible to accomplish, even by the 
most ardent researcher.  Currently, articles,84 books,85 dissertations,86 and 
 
 81. Jack J. Coe, Jr., Toward A Complementary Use of Conciliation in Investor-State 
Disputes—A Preliminary Sketch, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 7 (2005). 
 82. See generally UNCTAD, INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES: PREVENTION AND ALTERNATIVES 
TO ARBITRATION (2010); Mark A. Clodfelter, Why Aren’t More Investor-State Treaty Disputes 
Settled Amicably?, in UNCTAD, INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES: PREVENTION AND ALTERNATIVES TO 
ARBITRATION II (Susan D. Franck & Anna Joubin-Bret eds., 2011); Jeswald Salacuse, Is There a 
Better Way: Alternative Methods of Treaty-Based, Investor-State Dispute Resolution, 31 FORDHAM 
INT’L L. J. 138, 143-147 (2007); Susan Franck, Integrating Investment Treaty Conflict and Dispute 
Systems Design, 92 MINN. L. REV. 161 (2007); Jack J. Coe, Jr., Toward A Complementary Use of 
Conciliation in Investor-State Disputes—A Preliminary Sketch, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 7 
(2005). 
 83. INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, IBA RULES FOR INVESTOR-STATE MEDIATION 
(2012), available at 
http://www.ibanet.org/LPD/Dispute_Resolution_Section/Mediation/State_Mediation/Default.aspx. 
 84. For a non-exhaustive bibliography comprising fourteen pages (limited to NAFTA Chapter 
Eleven subjects), see CHARLES H. BROWER, II, ET AL., NAFTA CHAPTER ELEVEN REPORTS, VOL. I, 
683-99 (2005); see also Bibliography on Investment Law and Procedure, ICSID, 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/resources/Pages/Bibliography-on-Investment-Law-
and-Procedure.bak.aspx (last visited Jan. 17, 2015).   
 85. See ARBITRATING FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES (Norbert Horn ed., 2004); 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION: LEADING CASES FROM THE ICSID, NAFTA, 
BILATERAL TREATIES AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW (Todd Weiler ed., 2005); R. DOAK 
BISHOP, JAMES CRAWFORD, AND W. MICHAEL REISMAN, FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES: CASES, 
MATERIALS AND COMMENTARY (2005); NAFTA INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION: PAST 
ISSUES, CURRENT PRACTICE, FUTURE PROSPECTS (Todd Weiler ed., 2004); CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN, 
ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES (2007); 
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reports87 of various kinds seem to address every conceivable aspect of the 
field.  In this light, and with time and money ever limited, new book 
offerings must reach a high standard to make a meaningful contribution. 
In our view, Commentaries easily meets that standard.  The volume 
provides a wealth of information and thoughtful analysis.  Despite its size, 
Commentaries is highly searchable, and despite having been produced by 
many different authors from different legal cultures, the chapters are nicely 
integrated and substantive.  Commentaries will be a profitable read for law 
students, lawmakers, arbitrators, diplomats, and members of practicing bar.  
Accordingly, it is likely to become an oft-consulted reference. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHRISTOPHER F. DUGAN, ET. AL., INVESTOR STATE ARBITRATION (2008); THE FUTURE OF 
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION (Catherine A. Rogers & Roger P. Alford eds., 2009). 
 86. See, e.g., IOANA TODOR, THE FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT STANDARD IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT (2008) (based on doctoral research at European 
University Institute).  
 87. The systematically-produced publications of UNCTAD are particularly noteworthy. 
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